The First Amendment Case Against FCC IP Telephony Regulation by Samahon, Tuan N.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 51 | Issue 2 Article 9
3-1999
The First Amendment Case Against FCC IP
Telephony Regulation
Tuan N. Samahon
Georgetown University Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, First Amendment
Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samahon, Tuan N. (1999) "The First Amendment Case Against FCC IP Telephony Regulation," Federal Communications Law Journal:
Vol. 51: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol51/iss2/9
COMMENT
The First Amendment Case Against
FCC IP Telephony Regulation
Tuan N. Samahon*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 494
I1. DIGITAL CONVERGENCE AND THE IP TELEPHONY
REVOLUTION ................................................................................. 495
A. From Data over Voice Lines to Voice over Data Lines ........ 495
B. IP Telephony Industry Growth .............................................. 495
C. IP Telephony's Regulatory Advantage ................................. 497
Ill. FIRST AMENDMENT REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND IP
TELEPHONY .................................................................................. 499
A. Regulatory Divergence: Different Media, Different Rules...499
B. Common Carriage and the Universal Service Fund ............ 500
C. Common Carriage of the Internet Protocol Stack ................ 502
D. FCC Rules on IP Telephony .................................................. 503
1. Creating Distinct IP Regulatory Categories .................... 503
2. Case-by-Case IP Telephony Regulation ......................... 504
E. FCC Nonregulation as Mere Forbearance ........................... 504
1. Case Law and the "Wait-and-See" Approach ................. 505
2. Proposed Legislation ....................................................... 505
* B.A., Brigham Young University, 1996; candidate for J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center (GULC), 2000. Special thanks to GULC Adjunct Professor Daniel Brenner,
Vice President for Law and Regulatory Policy, National Cable Television Association, for
his insights and feedback; and to my wife, Lindsey, without whose support this Comment
would not have been possible.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
3. FCC Report to Congress and Other Statements .............. 506
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AGAINST REGULATION ....................... 507
A. Need for Constitutionally Entrenched Protection ................ 507
B. Standards of Review .............................................................. 508
1. The Case for Strict Scrutiny ............................................ 509
2. The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny ................................ 512
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTION .................................................................. 514
A. First Amendment Values Served ........................................... 515
B. Funding Irrespective of Technological Usage ...................... 515
C. Greater Accountability .......................................................... 517
D. Concerns: Diminished Innovation and Inequity ................... 517
V I. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 518
I. INTRODUCTION
At the present rate of digital innovation, the communications industry
promises to be a fruitful one for technocratically adept communications
lawyers, not only because digital innovation is so rapid, but because Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) rule making
continues to outpace new communications technologies. Notable in this
category is a nascent communications technology, Internet Protocol (IP)
telephony. In response to concerns about this technology's effect on uni-
versal access, the FCC has already crafted two new regulatory regimes.'
Yet, in the race to regulate, the FCC may have overlooked the First
Amendment. Although new digital "technologies of freedom ''2 allow un-
precedented freedom of expression (and at democratic rates), Congress, the
courts, and the FCC appear unwilling to acknowledge a First Amendment
limit to digital speech regulation.
This Comment argues that IP telephony, like handbills and traditional
print media, deserves First Amendment protection against FCC regulatory
authority. In Part II, this Comment briefly reviews the IP telephony phe-
nomenon within the larger context of "digital convergence," or the inter-
changeability of new media, noting both the technological innovations and
regulatory advantages IP telephony offers. Part Ell examines the FCC and
Supreme Court's technologically driven First Amendment jurisprudence.
In particular, this Comment notes the First Amendment's conspicuous ab-
1. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Report to Con-
gress].
2. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). Pool characterizes new
electronic modes of communication as twentieth century successors to the printing press,
pamphlets, and other traditionally highly protected media. Id. at 23.
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sence from the IP telephony dialogue, and, correspondingly, the promi-
nence of assurances of regulatory forbearance in Congress, the courts, and
the FCC. In response to this apparent constitutional lacuna, Part IV offers
First Amendment content-based and content-neutral arguments against the
proposed telephony regulations. This Comment argues that, at the very
least, the affordability and innovation IP telephony offers should constitute
nontrivial factors in a court's content-neutral balancing. Finally, Part V
proposes divorcing universal access funding from long-distance service.
Such a policy alternative would avoid burdening the First Amendment
values IP telephony serves as well as sidestep the category difficulties
digital convergence creates.
II. DIGITAL CONVERGENCE AND THE IP TELEPHONY
REVOLUTION
A. From Data over Voice Lines to Voice over Data Lines
Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool termed the "blurring [of] the lines be-
tween media" where a "single physical means... may carry services that
in the past were provided in separate ways" as the "convergence of the
modes."3 Whereas in the past one means existed to communicate in a par-
ticular way, such as telephones for one-to-one voice communication, now
multiple technologies exist to carry on personal instantaneous voice com-• - 4
munications. Once speakers sent data transmissions over telephone lines
built for voice; now the end-user can send voice, along with video, text, or
any other message, over lines built for data.5 Digitalization, or the use of
ones and zeroes to represent real world data, has eroded the traditional
mapping of one function to one technology by making information trans-
6
mission interchangeable. Such is the case with IP telephony.
B. IP Telephony Industry Growth
Internet protocol telephony, as its name suggests, originated with
software that allowed phone voice transmissions across the public Internet.
This early phone client software required that each speaker be connected to
the Internet from adequately equipped personal computers in order to
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See Jeff Pulver, Pulver Points on the Internet Telephony Industry (visited Feb. 15,
1999) <http://www.pulver.com/points/index.html>.
6. See Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Per-
sistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. RaV. 976,
983 (1997).
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make and receive calls. Even if the concerted effort to communicate suc-
ceeded, voice quality was typically poor. More advanced offerings im-
proved voice quality and added additional modes of communication, in-
cluding real-time text or chat.7 Internet protocol telephony users could not
only speak together, but also review the same manuscript together, even at
a distance. Still, expensive computer hardware limited widespread Internet
phone use.
Since these early internet phones, IP telephony has gone mainstream
and no longer remains the sole domain of "miserly geeks."8 Whereas In-
ternet phone client software once required a simultaneous Internet connec-
tion on two or more personal computers, IP telephony eliminates the need
to dial from a computer. Instead, a caller dials a "gateway" or computer
hardware that connects a speaker's phone-initiated call to an IP network;
the caller then dials the desired phone number and the gateway completes
the call to a standard phone handset.9 In order to improve voice fidelity,
some IP telephony firms have begun to create private IP networks, allow-
ing better sound quality by transmitting uncompressed voice data.' These
IP networks route part of the call over the busy public Internet, though
calls largely travel on the less crowded private IP data networks."
Internet protocol telephony offers an alternative to traditional analog
telephony. Old phone networks require a connection to be constantly es-
tablished and opened to continue voice communication. Dedicated circuit-
switched technology transmits not only discussion content, but also si-
lence. 2 As a result, switched technology inefficiently ties up phone re-
sources. Most phone services do not convert analog voice data into differ-
ent formats during phone calls; instead, the phone lines carry the analog
voice patterns through the switched phone connection uniquely dedicated
to the call at hand. Only when the parties terminate their phone call is the
circuit-switched network freed. In contrast, the various incarnations of In-
ternet telephony convert analog voice into digital data, compress the data,
7. See KEviN WERBACH, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS POLICY 38 (FCC, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper Series No. 29, 1997).
For example, Netscape Conference offers users real-time text in addition to voice.
8. Internet Telephony: Growing Up, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 56.
9. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 84 ("Gateways are
computers that transform the circuit-switched voice signal into IP packets, and vice versa,
and perform associated signaling, control, and address translation functions."). IDT Corpo-
ration and Qwest both offer gateway IP telephony. See Randolph Court, Shootout on the
Phone Frontier, WIRED NEWS (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/newsl
business/story/i 1295.html>.
10. See Spinning Gold from Glass, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 70.
11. See Internet Telephony: Growing Up, supra note 8, at 56-57.
12. See POOL, supra note 2, at 203-04.
[Vol. 51
FCC IP TELEPHONY REGULATION
and split the data into "packets" that are "routed" across different IP net-
work paths and reassembled and decompressed as voice output at some
distant destination.13 Digital technology's indifference to analog input al-
lows print, audio, video, and any other sort of data to be transported via the
Internet protocol. World Wide Web pages are similarly transmitted as
packetized data. Since IP networks divide data into individual packets and
send them through the most efficient routes, IP networks allow for more
information transmission than traditional circuit-switched networks. 4
As a result of its low price and its new ease of use, analysts predict IP
telephony will boom.5 Whereas less than a half percent of long-distance
telephone calls are presently placed over the Internet, by 2003, the IP te-
lephony market share will have grown to some 10 to 15 percent of domes-
tic long-distance calls.1
6
C. IP Telephony's Regulatory Advantage
Presently, the FCC heavily regulates long-distance phone calls, re-
quiring long-distance companies to pay a local exchange carrier (LEC) for
connecting and completing their calls. In turn, the long-distance phone
companies pass these "universal service" fees to phone callers as higher
costs. Traditional long-distance companies, like AT&T and MCI, pay local
phone companies approximately $.05 to $.06 per minute per call for using
17
their local networks to begin and end long-distance calls. Since some
competitive long-distance evening rates approach $.10 per minute, $.05 to
$.06 per minute in universal service fees represents approximately half of a
caller's costs to communicate, excluding federal excise taxes. In short,
universal service charges cut in half a phone caller's ability to communi-
cate long-distance by doubling the cost to do so.
13. Internet Telephony: Growing Up, supra note 8, at 57.
14. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 64.
15. See Stephanie N. Mehta, ICG Joins Telephony Price Wars, Plans 5.9 Cents a Min-
ute for Long Distance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at B8.
16. See Internet Telephony: Growing Up, supra note 8, at 57 (noting that IP telephony
calls presently account for 0.4% of the long-distance market and estimating that, by 2003,
IP will account for 25% of international calls worldwide, and that, by 2005, IP will account
for 15% of consumer domestic long-distance); FCC Considers Fees for Net Calls, USA
TODAY (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.usatoday.comllife/Cyber/techlctc428.htm>
(estimating that less than 0.5% of telephone calls are placed over the Internet, but that by
2003, such calls could account for 10-15% of the long-distance domestic market).
17. See WERBACH, supra note 7, at 37 fig.6 (noting that universal service fees add
about $.06 per minute to long-distance charges); Mike Mills, FCC Rule Could Hike Internet
Call Costs; Providers Would Face Telephone Firns' Fees, WASH. PoST, Apr. 3, 1998, at
D l (approximating fees as $.05 per minute); FCC Considers Fees for Net Calls, supra note
16 (estimating fees as roughly $.055 per minute).
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In contrast, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) definition of
"information services"' 8 allows IP telephony to escape universal service
charges by not billing information services and their data transmissions
universal service charges. 9 Under traditional categories perpetuated by the
Act, telecommunications law conceived of voice telephony as the realm of
point-to-point "telecommunications" and data transmission as the realm of
"information services"; but now digitalization permits voice to be both
telecommunications and digital data. Herein is IP telephony's biggest cost
advantage: Since IP telephony transmits voice as digital data like
"information services" rather than analog "telecommunications," 20 users
escape the costly long-distance access fees that feed universal service.2'
Consequently, part of IP telephony's attraction is its price.22 As a result, the
FCC and several rural senators have cried foul and sought to remedy the
access charge-free phone calling by closing the "loopholes" and making
long-distance phone callers meet their "obligations" to universal service2
3
by classifying IP telephony as "telecommunications"; those that operate IP
telephony firms as "telecommunications carriers"' 4 regulated as common
carriers; and their offerings as assessable "telecommunications services." z
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (Supp. II 1996).
"Information service" is defined as the offering of a capability for generating, ac-
quiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making avail-
able information via telecommunications, and [such term] includes electronic
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the manage-
ment, control or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of
a telecommunications service.
Id.
19. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 83.
20. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. II 1996) (defining "telecommunications" as "the
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent or received").
21. See WERBACH, supra note 7, at 37-38 fig.6; Douglas Lavin, Phone-Industry Revo-
lution Is Foreseen as Internet Poses Pricing Challenges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at B 11.
22. See Mehta, supra note 15, at B8.
23. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 4. But see Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ("The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount
of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted.").
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. H 1996) (A "telecommunications carrier" is "any
provider of telecommunications services .... A telecommunications carrier shall be treated
as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing
telecommunications services.").
25. See id. § 153(46) (defining "telecommunications service" as "the offering of tele-
communications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effec-
tively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used").
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HI. FIRST AMENDMENT REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND IP
TELEPHONY
A. Regulatory Divergence: Different Media, Different Rules
Although "convergence of the modes" unites media through digitali-
zation, past Supreme Court jurisprudence has fractured the First Amend-
ment along traditional media lines. In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Court rea-
soned that each media was "a law unto itself., 26 Similarly, in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, although the Court did recognize the broadcast
media's First Amendment interest, the Court created a different rule for
that medium.27 In fact, the Court has defined separate legal regimes gov-
erning print publications, telephony, broadcast, and cable television each
with differing degrees of media protection because of their differing char-
acters.2 Rather than create a First Amendment standard covering all ex-
pression, the Court has created medium-based rules.
However, more important than an aesthetic complaint about the
Court's media driven First Amendment doctrine is a substantive concern
about freedom of speech. Substantively, one's rights differ depending on
the medium of expression and its corresponding First Amendment status.
While the government may not place special tariffs on printed speech,
since World War I, phone speech has been subjected to special federal ex-
cise taxes.3 As digitalization continues to create new hybrid media, which
First Amendment standard applies will become a nontrivial constitutional
question. Does a hybrid IP telephony client, that supports print publishing
features like chat in addition to voice, deserve common carriage regulation
or the most guarded status of printed publications?
An answer to the question may lie in the recognition of the new me-
dium's function, broadly conceived, over its mechanism.3' While IP te-
26. Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). In Kovacs, a street
speaker used an amplifier to communicate his message. The Court held the ordinance ban-
ning amplifying devices on the street was consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 87.
27. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("[Dlifferences in the charac-
teristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."). The Court found the "fairness doctrine," or a speaker's "right to reply" on broad-
cast airtime, not only consistent with the First Amendment but also required by it. Id. at
375.
28. See POOL, supra note 2, at 233. Since Pool completed Technologies of Freedom,
the Court has created additional rules applicable only to the cable television medium. See
generally Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
29. See Price & Duffy, supra note 6, at 977.
30. See POOL, supra note 2, at 233.
31. See id. at 246. A telephone's function, narrowly conceived, is placing phone calls.
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lephony is a digital mechanism, the underlying function is communication.
Adding chat to IP clients would further illustrate the communicative func-
tion by actually including the traditionally highly protected print media. It
"would confuse the mechanism with the function to subject data networks
and storage devices to legal precedents from the previous electronic media
rather than to the law of print .... ,32 The First Amendment concern is that
digital convergence will diminish protection for functional equivalents of
otherwise protected speech.
Conversely, the advent of digital convergence might provide courts
with the opportunity to revisit the possibly unintentional effect of dimin-
ishing First Amendment protection for those using new technologies. At
the FCC, Commissioner Michael Powell recognizes the "need to reconcile
,,3
conflicting regulatory approaches, as do Professors Powe and Kratten-
maker who hope digital convergence will permit the courts "to discard the
inherently silly notion that freedom of speech depends on the configuration
of the speaker's voicebox or mouthpiece. 34
B. Common Carriage and the Universal Service Fund
Common carriage illustrates the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence that different rules apply to different media. In contrast to
print media's highly unregulated status, under the common carriage regu-
latory scheme, the government may regulate the ownership and the cost of
access to phone service.35 Traditionally, this control has been limited to
regulating the conduit, or the actual physical network, not the content.
Since local phone service creates "natural" monopolies, telephone com-
panies (telcos) are subject to government pricing restrictions and receive
government subsidy. In turn, the government reserves for itself substantial
Broadly conceived, the telephone's function (IP or otherwise) is communication. The level
of generality a court assumes could affect the outcome of controversies before it.
32. Id. at 199.
33. Opening Statement of FCC Commissioner Michael K. Powell Before the Subcomm.
on Commun. Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp. Comm.,
105th Cong. (June 10, 1998) (statement of Comm'r Powell), available in 1998 WL
12761904 [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearings].
34. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Princi-
ples for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1719 (1995).
35. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1994) (providing that a communications provider may not
be a carrier unless it first publishes tariffs approved by the FCC); 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2)
(Supp. 111996) (requiring a certificate of "public... convenience and necessity").
36. See POOL, supra note 2, at 241 (noting that most so-called monopolies are not natu-
ral but result from limited government grants of rights-of-way and other franchises and li-
censes that impede newcomer market entry).
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regulatory control and disallows telephone companies from regulating
speech transmitted over phone lines.37
The universal service access fund serves the legitimate government
interest of supporting telephone infrastructure interconnectivity by making
access affordable throughout the country. Universal service subsidizes lo-
cal phone service for low-income consumers and, more politically and fi-
nancially significant, subsidizes local phone companies in remote and
sparsely populated areas." Since telcos must attempt to recoup their infra-
structure costs with high phone subscription, without universal service
subsidies, it would be unprofitable for phone companies to operate in rural
areas unless they charged their few customers prohibitively high rates.
Phone service would then likely cease in some areas of the country as tel-
cos moved to more fertile, high-volume areas. Therefore, to the extent that
rural service depends on subsidy, IP telephony could eventually undermine
the present universal service funding mechanism.' 9
In a preemptive strike against such an eventuality, the American Car-
riers' Telecommunications Association (ACTA) petitioned the FCC asking
it to mandate that IP telephony companies and software manufacturers beS 40
regulated as common carriers subject to universal service requirements.
Specifically, ACTA sought to make these newcomers comply with com-
mon carriage requirements; namely, abiding by FCC rate regulation, re-
. .. .. 42
ceiving certifications of necessity, and paying LEC universal service ac-
cess fees for use of local networks like switchless long-distance resellers
do.43 American Carriers' Telecommunications Association characterized
its petition as public-spirited: It was "not in the public interest to permit
long-distance service to be given away ....,,44
37. Id. at 106.
38. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 6.
39. See WERBACH, supra note 7, at 38.
40. See Provision of Interstate and International Interexchange Telecommunications
Service via the "Internet" by Non-Tariffed, Uncertified Entities, ACTA Petition for De-
claratory Ruling, Special Relief, and Institution of Rulemaking, RM 8775, para. 3
[hereinafter ACTA Petition].
41. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1994).
42. See id. § 214(e).
43. See WERBACH, supra note 7, at 38.
44. ACTA Petition, supra note 40, para. 3. But see Provision of Interstate and Interna-
tional Interexchange Telecommunications Service via the "Internet" by Non-tariffed, Un-
certified Entities, CDT Comments in Opposition to ACTA Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
Special Relief, and Institution of Rulemaking, RM 8775, para. 6 (qualifying ACTA's claims
that IP telephony users do not pay any connection fees by noting that Internet service pro-
viders pass access charges on. to customers as higher monthly subscription rates)
[hereinafter CDT Comments on ACTA Petition].
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Cynicism about ACTA's motives aside,45 IP telephony could poten-
tially harm universal service in the future, and rural senators have vocally
voiced their upset.46 Presently, long-distance access charges fuel the uni-
versal fund. But as IP telephony grows in popularity and phone callers pay
less and less into universal service, the fund may dwindle and become in-
sufficient for telco universal access needs. Since IP telephony uses data
packets to convey voice data, technically an information service unfettered
by universal service payments, it avoids definition as a telecommunica-
tions carrier and the attached obligation to pay into universal service.
47
C. Common Carriage of the Internet Protocol Stack
In the phone communication arena, FCC regulation controls the con-
48duit, not how individuals use phone services. Yet, ACTA urged a more
intrusive regulation of IP telephony. Rather than proposing the more rea-
sonable regulation of underlying network and transport layer protocols
49
45. American Carriers' Telecommunications Association's public-spirited altruism and
proposed regulations are suspect as merely self-interested market protectionism. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1767-68
(1995) ("New regulations, ostensibly defended as public-interested or as helping viewers
and consumers, will often be a product of private self-interest, and not good for the public
at all. It is undoubtedly true that industries will often seek government help against the
marketplace, invoking public-spirited justifications for self-interested ends."). In addition to
serving government universal interconnectivity goals, ACTA members turn a handsome
profit. See WERBACH, supra note 7, at 38. When a new medium challenges an old medium,
an archetypical struggle follows: First, the old medium tries to prohibit or bar the opponent
from entry to protect market share. Second, prohibition failing, the incumbent buys heavily
into the new industry. See POOL, supra note 2, at 50. This scenario plays out accurately in
AT&T's stormy relationship with IP telephony. Initially, AT&T tried to restrict IP teleph-
ony entry; now, however, AT&T has invested in IP telephony as a major player with its
AT&T Global Clearinghouse offerings. See Randolph Court, AT&T Opens One-Stop IP
Shop, WIRED NEWS (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.wired.comlnewslbusiness/story/
11407.html>.
46. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 85. Several rural Re-
publican Senators, Rockefeller (R-WV), Snowe (R-ME), Stevens (R-AK), and Bums (R-
MT), argued IP telephony should be classified as "telecommunications services" rather than
"information services." Under the telecommunications services definition, IP telephony
would be subject to common carriage regulation and consequently universal service obliga-
tions. Id.
47. See id. para. 34.
48. See POOL, supra note 2, at 248 ("[Clontrol of the conduit may not become a means
for controlling content.").
49. See CDT Comments on ACTA Petition, supra note 44, at fig.l. The Internet's lay-
ered architecture features three different levels of information system networking and use:
Internet protocol (IP) forms the basis for the network layer over which subsequent "layers"
depend; the transport layer and its transport control protocol (TCP) operate "on top" of the
underlying network layer; finally, an application layer functions "at the top" of the protocol
stack where e-mail, video conferencing, chat, and Internet telephony operate. Id.
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ACTA sought FCC control of the application layer-where individuals de-. • 50
cide how they use Internet-based services. The Center for Democracy &
Technology urged denial of ACTA's request, noting first the FCC's tradi-
tional domain as solely "the underlying network and communications me-
dia and services, not how individuals use those services," and second, the
intrusiveness of regulating "computer software at the highest levels of the
network protocol stack.. .. ""
D. FCC Rules on IP Telephony
Recently, the Commission responded to ACTA and other petitioners'
requests to regulate IP telephony by announcing tentative rule making. For
the purposes of regulation, the FCC will distinguish between "computer-
to-computer" Internet phone client software (clients) and IP telephony
gateways that permit "phone-to-phone" IP telephony (gateways). 2 Clients
will remain unregulated since Internet service providers (ISPs) cannot be
aware of what particular customers are doing with their Internet connec-
tions.53 Gateways, at least on the Commission's present record, could be-
come regulated on a case-by-case basis, owing to their apparent lack of in-
formation service characteristics and their telecommunications service
flavor54
1. Creating Distinct IP Regulatory Categories
The tentative rules create two different categories, one for each IP
telephony: Gateway IP telephony will fall under common carriage re-
50. See id. para. 2.
51. Id.
52. See Universal Serm. Report to Congress, supra note 1, paras. 87-89. Phone-to-
phone IP telephony is defined as
services in which the provider.., holds itself out as providing voice telephony or
facsimile transmission service ... does not require the customer to use CPE
[customer premises equipment] different from that CPE necessary to place an or-
dinary touch-tone call (or facsimile transmission) over the public switched tele-
phone network... allows the customer to call telephone numbers assigned in ac-
cordance with the North American Numbering Plan, and associated international
agreements; and.., it transmits customer information without net change in form
or content.
Id.
53. See infra text accompanying note 74.
54. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 89. At the time of this
Comment's writing, BellSouth announced its intent to assess Internet Telephony Service
Providers (LTSPs) access charges "to such [ITSP] traffic as it becomes aware of... within
its region." BellSouth, Internet Telephony (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:ll
www.bellsouthcorp.com/issues/telephony/position.html>. BellSouth claims it requires no
additional FCC action to assess ITSPs access charges. Id.
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quirements, and client IP telephony will enjoy full protection from gov-S 5 1
ernment regulation. In trying to emphasize the limited scope of the FCC
regulation, Commission Chairman William Kennard unintentionally high-
lighted the increasingly ad hoc character of communication regulation.
"We are simply identifying a very narrow category of service-IP teleph-
ony-that shares many of the characteristics of a telecommunications
service. 56 This sort of balkanization has been variously termed as
"regulatory apartheid" 57 and "scholastic. 5 Dissenting from the Commis-
sion's Report to Congress, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth noted the
"artificial and fragile" regulatory framework and characterized the Com-
mission's rule as relying on end-users' psychological state of mind to de-
termine regulatory status: If a consumer believes the technology is a
phone, regulate it like telecommunications; if a consumer thinks the tech-• • • 59
nology is a computer, regulate it like an information service.
2. Case-by-Case IP Telephony Regulation
To the extent the FCC determines that a gateway IP telephony service
is a "telecommunications service," section 254(d) would govern these pro-
viders and would require that IP telephony firms contribute to the univer-
sal service fund.60 Since the Commission's record suggests some gateway
telephony lacks information service characteristics, and "information
service" and "telecommunications service" are taken to be mutually exclu-
sive categories,62 some gateway telephony could be "telecommunications
service" subject to fees. Consequently, the Commission will need to ex-
amine each IP telephony service on a case-by-case basis to decide whether
that offering is an information service. Instead of creating a rule for a new
technology, the FCC will have no rules, only particular determinations.
E. FCC Nonregulation as Mere Forbearance
First Amendment values have rarely entered the FCC or Supreme
Court's recent telecommunications regulatory calculus. The FCC's inac-
tion, such as the decision to only regulate on a case-by-case basis, has
55. See infra text accompanying note 74.
56. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note I (statement of Chairman Ken-
nard).
57. 141 CONG. REc. S7885 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
58. POOL, supra note 2, at 250.
59. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1 (statement of Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth).
60. Id. para. 92.
61. Id. para. 55.
62. Id. para. 13.
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rested on free market policy objectives rather than recognized constitu-
tional limitations to its authority. In the Commission's view, no freedom of
speech issue is implicated in IP telephony regulation, only an FCC judg-
ment that a "hands-off' approach serves pro-competitive values. "[T]he
only thing that leads the FCC to refrain from control is its benevolent
judgment., 63 Recent case law, proposed legislation, and Commission
statements illustrate this concept of government qua benevolent despot re-
fraining from flexing its might.
1. Case Law and the "Wait-and-See" Approach
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, the Court adopted what has been termed the "jurisprudence of the
particular," or a highly contextual approach to the First Amendment. 4 This
all-things-considered balancing allows a reviewing judge considerable dis-
cretion in choosing the appropriate standard for First Amendment protec-
tion analysis. 5 Justice Breyer's plurality espouses "a non-categorical 'wait
and see' approach to free speech cases involving new technologies."66 The
opinion reasons that given digital technology's dynamism, a First
Amendment category chosen today would be obsolete by tomorrow.67
However, by not adopting any standard of protection, but making
highly atomistic case-by-case decisions on specific technologies, First
68Amendment values are jeopardized. In fact, if one expects digital tech-
nology to stop innovating before crafting an appropriate First Amendment
standard to protect speech, one might "wait and see" for a considerable
time.
2. Proposed Legislation
Legislation before the House evidences a similar zeal for deregula-
tion accompanied with a presumption of authority to regulate without con-
63. POOL, supra note 2, at 222.
64. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (plurality
opinion); see also Price & Duffy, supra note 6, at 996.
65. See Price & Duffy, supra note 6, at 1005.
66. Mark S. Kende, The Supreme Court's Approach to the First Amendment in Cyber-
space: Free Speech as Technology's Hand-maiden, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 465, 466 (1997).
67. Id. at 467.
68. See DenverArea Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 781 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (The Court "applies no standard, and by this omission loses sight of existing
First Amendment doctrine. When confronted with a threat to free speech in the context of
an emerging technology, we ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by reference to
existing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles."); Fred H. Cate, Telephone
Companies, The First Amendment, and Technological Convergence, 45 DEPAuL L. REv.
1035, 1064 (1996).
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stitutional bar. H.R. 2372 espouses several good public policy reasons for
not regulating the Internet and the data packets that travel along it: in-
creased competition; the novelty of the industry; and the innovation of the
industry.69 But a constitutional First Amendment bar is absent. Congress's
statutory language only suggests forbearance and procompetitive goals as
reasons for not regulating, without any mention of free speech values. On
the contrary, the bill presumes a dormant power to regulate. For instance,
section 231(a)(2)(B) reserves to Congress "the authority to determine
when and if.. . regulation of Internet information services is in the public
interest. '70 Aside from language reserving to Congress the authority to
regulate, H.R. 2372 also implicitly grants the FCC authority to regulate by
acknowledging the agency's need to forbear from regulating. Section
231(c)(1) requires that the "Commission shall forbear from applying any
• ,,71
regulation, noting that "forbearance is consistent with the public inter-
est."72
3. FCC Report to Congress and Other Statements
When the IP telephony community expressed anxiety at the seem-
ingly borderless Commission case-by-case approach to regulation, a senior
FCC staffer reassured that the agency has "the discipline and the foresight
and the wisdom to not fall down the [regulatory] slope., 73 Although the
Commission has not as yet enforced its tentative IP telephony regulations,
FCC rule making to regulate gateway IP telephony on a case-by-case basis
provides no principled basis on which to determine First Amendment
speech rights. The FCC's assertion of authority over the Internet's data
packets in the context of gateway IP telephony creates regulatory concern
because protected print content is impossible to distinguish from voice
content when packetized as data. All information, print, voice, or other-
wise, travels the Internet as indistinguishable data packets. Even if the dif-
ferent data packets could be distinguished in transit, it would seem some-
what arbitrary to disfavor voice data packets by taxing them. Moreover,
with respect to IP client software, the FCC only noted ISP obliviousness to
end-user application use, not a First Amendment bar, as a reason for not
69. See H.R. 2372, 105th Cong. § 231(a)(2)(B) (1997).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 231(c)(1).
72. Id. § 231(c)(1)(D).
73. Louis Trager, FCC Regulation of Net Telephony Possible, INTER@CTIVE WEEK
(visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/print/980413/306725.html>.
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regulating.74 This justification leaves open to the FCC future regulation of
all Internet phone telephony.
In the April 1998 Universal Service Report to Congress, Commis-
sioner Powell expressed Justice Breyer-like Denver Area concerns about
creating a standard by which IP telephony would be regulated.75 Like Jus-
tice Breyer, Commissioner Powell argued digital innovation would likely
frustrate new categories, and therefore, no standard at all should be
76
adopted. Yet, in failing to adopt a standard, the FCC also admitted no
limits to its authority to regulate. A standardless standard could permit the
Commission to burden communication otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. During FCC reauthorization hearings, Commissioner Powell
cited the need to reconcile regulatory regimes in a procompetitive ap-
proach, but again the First Amendment was not mentioned.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AGAINST REGULATION
A. Need for Constitutionally Entrenched Protection
Since public policy rationales can change with congressional moods
and interest group politics, there is a real value in establishing an en-
trenched First Amendment protection as opposed to relying on mere gov-
ernmental forbearance or grace. For example, in Congress, free-market
speak has become fashionable, but much of this talk is empty rhetoric. Re-
cently, Senator Conrad Bums (R-Montana) lambasted the FCC for in-
creasing universal service taxes (the "Gore" tax) 78 while Bums simultane-
ously urged the FCC to classify ISPs as "telecommunications services"
subject to universal service contributions rather than their present universal
service exempt status as "information service."79 Given such detachment
between "do as I say" and "do as I do," a First Amendment constitutional
bar to IP telephony regulation could entrench civil liberties against present
as well as future government whimsy.
The First Amendment presumes freedom of speech and freedom of
the press: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."8" In Kovacs, Justice Black argued that "[t]he basic
74. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 42.
75. See id. (separate statement of Comm'r Powell).
76. See id.
77. See Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 33 (statement of Comm'r Powell).
78. See Statement of Senator Conrad Burns Commun. Subcomm. of the Commerce,
Science and Transp. Comm. Hearing on Reauthorization of the FCC, 105th Cong. (June 10,
1998), available in 1998 WL 12760973.
79. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 42.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments of commu-
nication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall
be free from governmental censorship or prohibition.',81 Yet, courts have
occasionally turned the presumption upside down. For example in Hawai-
ian Telephone Co., the Supreme Court construed the common carriage
statute to limit the offering of a new telephone service without the FCC's
prior approval; Hawaiian Telephone Co. held that the FCC must first find
that "the public convenience and necessity dictate a new [phone] service"
before authorizing it.82 By analogy, if IP telephony is in fact a technology
of freedom, and licensing the right to make EP telephony service available
is based on whether the FCC "dictates" or "requires" it, a First Amend-
ment challenge of the regulation might allow the court to revisit and recon-
sider the issue of phone common carriage, this time in the IP telephony in-
carnation. Since human ingenuity leads to new modes of communication,
courts examine new phenomena by analogy with old. However, there are
both good and bad analogies, and one may fear that courts fail to recognize
the new digital mechanism's underlying communicative function.
B. Standards of Review
Most threshold arguments in First Amendment cases concern the
standard of review. If a petitioner can establish that a regulation is content-
based, strict scrutiny and its fatal review will invalidate almost any regula-
tion." However, noncensorial content-neutral restrictions invoke either a
deferential rational basis review84 or an intermediate scrutiny.15 Typically,
these content-neutral regulations limit communication irrespective of the
message conveyed.16 Content-neutral review involves judicial weighing of
First Amendment interests against legitimate government interests. The
greater the interference with opportunities for free expression, the greater
the burden the government carries in establishing the regulation's consti-
tutionality."7 "[Tihe first amendment prohibits not only content-based re-
strictions that censor particular points of view, but also content-neutral re-
strictions that unduly constrict the opportunities for free expression."" To
81. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 53
(1987).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 52.
86. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 189, 189 (1983).
87. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 83, at 52.
88. Id. at 58. For example, content-based regulations of billboards advocating nazism
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the extent that a content-neutral restriction excessively burdens IP teleph-
ony, the courts could still find the new regulations violative of First
Amendment values.
1. The Case for Strict Scrutiny
To establish that a regulation is content-based and thereby trigger
strict scrutiny analysis, one must establish "a governmental preference for
one set of speakers over another based on the content of their speech."'89
The government rules must evince a preference for a "particular type, for-
mat or content of speech."'9
In the case of IP telephony, it might be argued that a new requirement
to pay into universal service-functionally the equivalent of a tax on
speech, since costs are expected to be passed on to consumers-is a tax9
on long-distance speech. The speech is content-based because through
taxation it disfavors one set of speakers, long-distance urban speakers,
while simultaneously subsidizing another group, local rural speakers. The
situation might be akin to past legislative malapportionment where rural
voters had a more effective voice than others due to an apportionment
mechanism that gave rural states greater House seats than justified by
population.92
Turner I and Turner II provide a relevant analogy for this strict scru-
tiny claim. In the Turner cases, Congress required cable programmers to
carry local broadcast content in preference to cable editorially selected
content.93 This "must-carry" provision benefited local broadcast content
over cable programming's editorial discretion.94 In her Turner I dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued that a government interest in "localism" is insuf-
ficient justification for must-carry's burden on cable editorial control.95 "It
is for private speakers and listeners, not for the government, to decide what
are less intrusive of the quantity of free speech than content-neutral regulations barring bill-
boards altogether. Id.
89. Allen S. Hammond, Regulating the Multi-Media Chimera: Electronic Speech
Rights in the United States, 21 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 59-60 (1995).
90. Id. at 76.
91. See POOL, supra note 2, at 15-16 (noting taxation, prior restraint, and licensing re-
quirements as mechanisms of government speech control).
92. Cf. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1383 (1994) (Malapportionment gave rural voters a voting advan-
tage disproportionate to their numbers and amplified their voice as compared to urban vot-
ers.).
93. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1184 (1997) (Turnerl).
94. See Hammond, supra note 89, at 67.
95. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (Turner 1).
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fraction of their news and entertainment ought to be of a local character
and what fraction ought to be of a national (or international) one. 96 In ef-
fect, the government regulated the content of speech, local being preferred
to national.
RURAL URBAN
(high cost, sparsely (low cost, densely
populated) populated)
LOCAL SERVICE Most heavily subsi- Intermediate tax bur-
dized by universal dens and benefits
service fund, not as- from universal serv-
sessed for universal ice
service
DOMESTIC LONG- Intermediate tax bur- Most heavily taxed
DISTANCE SERVICE dens and benefits from by universal service
universal service assessments, least
likely to receive sub-
sidy
The above table illustrates the most favored class of speakers (rural, local speech)
and the most disfavored class (long-distance urban speech), with the latter subsi-
dizing the former under present universal service funding.
In opposition, it could be argued that "local, rural speakers" is simply
a technical group, and that there really is no particular type of speech being
favored when burdening urban, long-distance speakers. In the different
context of differential newspaper speech taxation, Grosjean v. American
Press Co. held that differential media taxes only invoke strict scrutiny
when taxes are seen to be "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise
of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is enti-
tled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. 97 Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue further clarified the
Grosjean holding by explaining that newspapers can be made subject "to
generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional
problems." Moreover, in Leathers v. Medlock, the Supreme Court up-
dated the differential press taxation rule to hold that "[a] tax is ... suspect
96. ld.
97. Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
98. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983).
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if it targets a small group of speakers" 99 and "that the general applicability
of any burdensome tax law helps to ensure that it will be met with wide-
spread opposition,"'00 making censorial intent less likely. Since universal
service charges are generally applicable to long-distance calling and are
not specific to urban speakers, one might conclude that these taxes do not
unconstitutionally burden speech.
However, beyond taxes of general applicability like federal excise
taxes,'01 universal service access charges are truly disparate in their effect
on particular classes of speakers. In particular, access charges are more
than double those for long-distance. Since urban local speech is high
volume, the universal access services do not widely benefit urban speak-
ers. Rural, local callers are the most heavily subsidized speakers who pay
no universal access charges yet benefit from low-cost subsidized services.
Urban long-distance callers pay the heaviest universal access fees as none
of the funds subsidize their relatively low-cost local service.
Realistically, though, it is unlikely a court would recognize universal
service's potential burden on IP telephony as grounds for strict scrutiny. In
a recent case, Laurence Tribe argued on BellSouth's behalf for strict scru-
tiny of the Act's section 151(a) provisions barring the Bell Operating
Companies from entering electronic publishing.'0 3 The D.C. Circuit denied
content-based strict scrutiny review and instead granted intermediate scru-
tiny of what it termed as "content-neutral structural regulations."'0 The
court ruled that strict scrutiny was unwarranted because there was no leg-
islative intent to discriminate. 105The court's unwillingness to strike section
15 1(a) makes it all the more unlikely that courts would concede a rigorous
review standard and strictly review tax classifications such as categorizing
IP telephony under common carriage and obligating universal service
payments.106
99. Leathers, 499 U.S. 439,445-47 (1991).
100. Id. at445.
101. See, e.g., Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Bums).
102. See supra text accompanying note 17.
103. See BellSouth Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 68. But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 445-47 (1991) (making
explicit that "[illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment").
106. See Benjamin Lombard, Note, First Amendment Limits on the Use of Taxes to Sub-
sidize Selectively the Media, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 106, 108 (1992).
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2. The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny
Even if a strict scrutiny argument against IP telephony regulation
fails, a content-neutral argument for intermediate scrutiny remains. In
United States v. O'Brien, intermediate scrutiny was cast as a balancing of
multiple factors, including noncensorial government interests and the inci-
dental restriction of First Amendment freedoms no greater than essential to
further the government interest.1°7'Relevant to this balancing is the Court's
"rock-paper-scissors" hierarchy of competing constitutional provisions:
Whereas the First Amendment trumps the Common Carriage Clause, 08 the
Revenue Clause'°9 can trump the First Amendment and vice versa."0 Since
universal service falls within the Common Carriage Clause, First Amend-
ment interests take priority. However, since the Revenue Clause is also
implicated in universal service access charges, a balancing of relevant
factors would decide the outcome of IP telephony regulation. On one hand,
government has a legitimate interest in encouraging universal interconnec-
tivity through universal access funding. On the other hand, there is a cer-
tain First Amendment value of cheap communication with IP telephony in
an immediacy one can only presently attain by phone. Although universal
service does not ban long-distance speech, the charges burden speech by
making it twice as expensive.
One important First Amendment value is quantity of expression,"
and therefore by implication, affordability of expression. "[T]o the extent
that content-neutral restrictions actually reduce the total quantity of ex-
pression, they necessarily undermine the 'search for truth,' impede mean-
ingful participation in 'self-governance,' and frustrate individual 'self-
fulfillment.""'12 Prohibitively expensive expression reduces the quantity of
expression, thereby undermining an important First Amendment value.
Since money makes more speech possible in many contexts, govern-
mental universal service taxation limits speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court invalidated a federal election expenditure ceiling as violative of the
First Amendment. 13 The Court held that such a limitation placed "direct
and substantial restraints" on the ability of citizens to engage in protected
107. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (1968); Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 86, at
190.
108. The Common Carriage Clause provides that Congress has the power "[t]o establish
Post Offices and post Roads." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; POOL, supra note 2, at 83.
109. The Revenue Clause provides Congress with the authority "[t]o lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
110. See POOL, supra note 2, at 82-83.
111. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 86, at 193.
112. Id.
113. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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political expression.1 4 Buckley is especially apropos in this setting. Uni-
versal service taxation palpably reduces the monetary ability of long-
distance urban speakers to communicate:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to se-
cure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources,"' and "to assure unfettered interchange of





Even though a restriction is content-neutral, it can still reduce the quantity
of speech so substantially as to jeopardize individuals' opportunities to en-
gage in free speech.'
6
One of IP telephony's advantages as speech is the novel mode of in-
expensive communication it permits. In First Amendment cases for market
entry, a would-be competitor could overcome legislative obstacles to entry
by relying on the novelty of its new services." 7 A new service could
"brigade" with content providers or consumers demanding the novel serv-
ice."" For example, IP telephony software clients permit voice, video, and
chat transmission. These services might be made available through gate-
way-like systems that support voice and video."9 Other innovations in-
clude one-to-many interactive IP telephony services, mimicking real-world
public forums that traditional telephone service is unable to offer afforda-
bly.
20
But beyond its novel offerings, IP telephony's greatest advantage is
the affordability it brings to long-distance speech. This reduced cost could
factor into a court's First Amendment intermediate scrutiny balancing as
the low cost dramatically reduces the cost of speech, thereby increasing the
quantity of speech. This is borne out on the Internet, but also in older set-
tings. When England reduced newspaper taxes, circulation boomed.' 2' As
paper cost decreased in early printing, communication increased.'22 Alter-
114. Id. at39.
115. Id. at 48-49.
116. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 83, at 59-60. See also supra
text accompanying note 88.
117. See Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry into Video Services: A First
Amendment Analysis, 67 NoTREDAMEL. REV. 97, 135 (1991).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Jeff Pulver, The Pulver Report for April 19, 1998 (visited Feb. 15, 1999)
<http:llpulver.com/reports/reqaprl998.htm>.
120. Cf Hammond, supra note 89, at 21.
121. See POOL, supra note 2, at 19, 255 n.27.
122. Id. at 19-20.
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natively, because of telegraphy's and telephony's initial expense, they
were not at first viewed as a medium of expression.1 3 To be sure, the
Kovacs majority did not find inexpensive speech part of the First Amend-
ment. "That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by
sound trucks... is not enough to call forth constitutional protection...
,,124 Yet, this position leaves little communicative alternative if other
modes of speech are prohibitively expensive. m
Low cost seems to be a relevant First Amendment interest, even if IP
telephony is not entirely new and duplicates some functions of standardt. . 126
telephony. Lower long-distance costs could serve the First Amendment
by lessening the "constraint to do business, consult, debate, and socialize
within one's own region only."'127 Additionally, new IP telephony services
support democratic ideals of access. Previously disenfranchised groups can
now benefit from inexpensive participation in the marketplace of ideas.'2
Since IP telephony lowers cost barriers to speech, courts should consider
affordability when balancing First Amendment differential tax burdens
against government interests. 129
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Digital convergence strains the Commission's present regulatory re-
gime because new technologies with multiple communicative modes defy
neat, traditional telecommunications categories. Moreover, new digital of-
ferings, such as the increasingly varied forms of IP telephony, will un-
likely become simpler to categorize. On the contrary, new IP telephony of-
ferings will permit digital transmission of highly protected print speech
and support voice transmission in digital fora, all of which raise an impor-
tant question: What law will govern the new technology-print, broadcast,
or common carriage? Technologies that are classifiable by a unique com-
municative mode will increasingly become things of the past as digitaliza-
123. Id. at 91.
124. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
125. See William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court:
The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 757, 766 (1986) ("[A]ltemative means of communication, which are always available
in theory, are of little value to those who cannot afford them.").
126. Cf. Brenner, supra note 117, at 144 (inquiring whether there is a First Amendment
interest in duplicate, but cheaper, cable service).
127. POOL, supra note 2, at 229.
128. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech
and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1847 (1995).
129. See Brenner, supra note 117, at 150.
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tion multiplies the ways by which one may communicate with one tech-
nology.
Assuming, arguendo, the government's interest in protecting univer-
sal connectivity is legitimate, exploring a policy alternative that will sup-
port universal access without jeopardizing the First Amendment seems
reasonable. One possible solution to the present means of fueling universal
service is to detach its funding from regulatory assessments on the usage
of particular services. Instead, federal general budget appropriations could
provide the funding universal service requires without relying on revenues
derived from taxing particular technological categories that may become
outdated. Noted below are several possible benefits, as well as possible
difficulties, with this approach.
A. First Amendment Values Served
If speech affordability is in fact an implicit consideration in First
Amendment analysis, then funding universal service by a mechanism other
than taxing (and thereby increasing the cost of long-distance) could serve
important First Amendment values. As noted previously, universal service
places a substantial regulatory burden on long-distance speech.3' Even if a
First Amendment analysis did not conclude differential taxation of long-
distance merited strict scrutiny, the government-imposed reduction of ur-
ban long-distance speech's affordability-sometimes increasing the cost
by a factor of two-challenges the First Amendment's supposition that
more speech is better than less speech.
To be sure, tax revenues would still continue to fund universal serv-
ice. However, because the costs of universal service will be more evenly
borne by all, the burden such taxation imposes on long-distance speech
would be more attenuated and less differential than that imposed by direct
taxation of phone speech, IP telephony or otherwise. Rather than one class
of speakers (urban, long-distance) heavily subsidizing another class of
speakers (rural, local), universal service would come out of Congress's
general coffers. Under this plan, universal service's total cost might not
differ, but the cost to any one group of speakers would be less than that
where one group of speakers disproportionately bears the costs.
B. Funding Irrespective of Technological Usage
At present, universal service taxes callers in relation to their long-
distance phone usage. But with digital convergence and universal connec-
tivity charges, flight from the taxable ordinary telephony to the untaxable
130. See supra Part III.
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IP telephony will increase. 31 This flight, in turn, reduces universal serv-
ice's tax base. In this context, Chairman William Kennard recently re-
peated two primary, and at present competing, FCC goals: "(1) safeguard
universal service support, including that needed for high-cost areas, and
simultaneously (2) avoid stifling the development or deployment of inno-
vative new information services."3 2 Under the present tax scheme, one of
the two goals must fail: Either universal service will eventually need to be
funded by taxing new digital offerings, or new digital technologies will
prosper while access supports languish.
Instead of an approach that yields stark either/or results, the Commis-
sion might attain its connectivity goals by funding universal service inde-
pendently of a particular technology use. Rather than taxing IP telephony
or some other new innovative information service each time someone calls
long-distance, Congress could appropriate funding for universal service
from its general budget, perhaps as revenue generated from income tax. As
for the FCC's first goal, this approach would safeguard universal service
support by removing funding contingency. At present, the Commission
finds itself in the reactive position of the little Dutch boy plugging holes in
the dike with his fingers: The FCC funds universal service by trying to
capture new technologies such as IP telephony under traditional taxable
categories (telecommunications service) in order to furnish universal
service with an adequate common carriage tax base. 33 Consequently, the
Commission is obligated to plug leaking holes in its system by increas-
ingly stretching its statutory constructions to fit new technologies under
old regulatory classifications. In the FCC's Report to Congress on univer-
sal service, Chairman Kennard frankly confessed his agency's new herme-
neutic premise: "It is critical... [in classifying IP telephony] to make sure
that our interpretation of the statute, to the extent legally possible, will
continue to sustain universal service in the future."'3 However, the FCC's
best exegetical efforts notwithstanding, rational, cost-evading innovators
will likely once more outmaneuver a priori line drawing. If Congress
made universal service supports independent of technology usage, then
technological categorization as either a "telecommunications service" or
"information service" would no longer matter for universal service pur-
poses. Sufficient funding would no longer depend on a contingent technol-
ogy remaining a static tax base, and category problems would not affect
funding.
131. See Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 85.
132. Id. (statement of Comm'r Ness).
133. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp. II 1996).
134. Universal Serv. Report to Congress, supra note 1, para. 98.
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Second, by deriving universal service funding directly from Congress
and not through phone tariffs, the FCC could "avoid stifling... new in-
formation services"' 3 5 with burdensome regulatory charges. Internet Proto-
col telephony could attain its full potential as a tool for distance learning,
democratic political participation, and social intercourse.
C. Greater Accountability
A collateral benefit of a direct congressional universal service grant
might be greater decision-maker accountability. Recently, the so-called
"Gore tax" billed long-distance phone users $2.02 billion through hidden
incremental rate increases.136 Although it is not clear that congressional
proceedings are substantially more transparent than administrative agency
rule making, congressional control of purse strings might allow greater
political accountability by placing responsibility with an institution that is
regularly and directly elected rather than an administrative agency that
may be either politically-insulated or industry-captured. In West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Justice Scalia in a nonlegal policy aside noted
that taxes placed into a general fund are less likely to be abused than those
placed in a segregated fund.137 Were universal service's segregated funds
placed in a general revenue fund, abuse of funding might be less likely as
"citizens perceive that the money (in the general fund) is available for any
number of competing ... purposes." 8 These competing purposes, in turn,
would serve to ensure that universal service funding was efficiently
achieved.
D. Concerns: Diminished Innovation and Inequity
Although detaching universal service financing from long-distance
phone usage would burden long-distance speech less than at present, it is
uncertain what effect direct appropriation for universal service would have
on innovation. For example, such appropriations might have a negative
impact on IP telephony. If there is no longer a regulatory and therefore
cost advantage to using IP telephony over ordinary telephony, investors
might not be willing to sink the money to develop digital replacements for
cheap analog service. At the same time, beyond its regulatory advantages,
IP telephony is an innovative technology permitting reliable data transmis-
135. Id. (statement of Comm'r Ness).
136. Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Bums).
137. West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. Id.
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sion in addition to voice.'39 Any innovative technology inviting investment
returns will likely attract financing.
Finally, would such a directly financed universal service fund be eq-
uitable? Would rich people pay less and poor people pay more as the gov-
ernment distributes universal service burdens among all taxpayers on a
general basis rather than differentially taxing long-distance callers? Ineq-
uity might be less a question of the poor paying more than at present than a
question of local speakers in sparsely populated areas paying more than at
present. To the extent that the poor are rural local speakers, inequity could
become a real issue requiring redress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Internet Protocol telephony and other technologies of freedom de-
serve First Amendment protection against FCC regulatory authority. The
First Amendment's conspicuous absence from the IP telephony dialogue
and the prominence of reassurances of regulatory forbearance in Congress,
the courts, and the FCC should create cause for concern. However, tenable
First Amendment content-based and content-neutral arguments exist
against the proposed IP telephony regulations. Moreover, the affordability
and innovation IP telephony offer should constitute nontrivial factors in a
content-neutral balancing act. An improved policy alternative to the pres-
ent means of funding universal service is to detach universal service
funding from long-distance or any other mode of communicative function.
Instead, direct federal grants could provide the funding universal service
requires without relying on a particular technology that may become out-
dated or burdening speech that is First Amendment protected.
139. See Spinning Gold from Glass, supra note 10, at 68.
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